# Asterisk Security Release 23.4.1

**URL:** <https://community.asterisk.org/t/asterisk-security-release-23-4-1/113395>\
**Category:** Asterisk News\
**Created:** [June 25, 2026, 5:20pm UTC](https://community.asterisk.org/t/asterisk-security-release-23-4-1/113395 "2026-06-25T17:20:19Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 3\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![asteriskteam](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/asterisk/user_avatar/community.asterisk.org/asteriskteam/32/1845_2.png) [@asteriskteam](https://community.asterisk.org/u/asteriskteam)\
**Post date:** [June 25, 2026, 5:20pm UTC](https://community.asterisk.org/t/asterisk-security-release-23-4-1/113395/1 "2026-06-25T17:20:19Z")

</div>

The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release  
Asterisk 23.4.1.

The release artifacts are available for immediate download at

> **[Release Asterisk Release 23.4.1 · asterisk/asterisk](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/23.4.1)**
>
> The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release
> Asterisk 23.4.1.
> The release artifacts are available for immediate download at
> https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/ta...

and

> **[Index of /pub/telephony/asterisk/](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/)**

Repository: [GitHub - asterisk/asterisk: The official Asterisk Project repository. · GitHub](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk)  
Tag: 23.4.1

## Change Log for Release asterisk-23.4.1

### Links:

- [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-23.4.1.html)
- [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/23.4.0...23.4.1)
- [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk/asterisk-23.4.1.tar.gz)
- [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/asterisk)

### Summary:

- Commits: 19
- Commit Authors: 6
- Issues Resolved: 0
- Security Advisories Resolved: 20
  - [GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5): chan\_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone\_number and crash Asterisk
  - [GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw): NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
  - [GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp): Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
  - [GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx): Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
  - [GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f): Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
  - [GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h): Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format\_ogg\_speex)
  - [GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf): Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
  - [GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6): Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing
  - [GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2): CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan\_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
  - [GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94): Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
  - [GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f): Stack buffer overflow in res\_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
  - [GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m): SQL Injection in cel\_pgsql and cel\_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
  - [GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5): Asterisk app\_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
  - [GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx): Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
  - [GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp): LDAP Filter Injection in res\_config\_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)
  - [GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687): Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
  - [GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959): ARI setChannelVar bypasses live\_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
  - [GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c): ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
  - [GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3): Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
  - [GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c): ast\_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE

### User Notes:

### Upgrade Notes:

### Developer Notes:

- 
#### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live\_dangerously.
ARI applications can no longer call “dangerous” dialplan  
functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without  
enabling “live\_dangerously” in asterisk.conf.  
Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959

### Commit Authors:

- George Joseph: (6)
- Mike Bradeen: (3)
- Milan Kyselica: (7)
- Pengpeng Hou: (1)
- Roberto Paleari: (1)
- ThatTotallyRealMyth: (1)

## Issue and Commit Detail:

### Closed Issues:

- !GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5: chan\_unistim DIALPAGE digit handling can overflow phone\_number and crash Asterisk
- !GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw: NULL Pointer Dereference in HTTP AMI Digest Authentication
- !GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp: Reflected XSS in Phone Provisioning HTTP Error Pages
- !GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx: Stack buffer overflow in MWI NOTIFY Message-Account parsing
- !GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f: Out-of-Bounds Read in Q.931 Information Element Parser (H.323 Addon)
- !GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h: Heap Buffer Overflow in OGG/Speex File Playback (format\_ogg\_speex)
- !GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf: Buffer over-read in Asterisk PJSIP MWI body parser
- !GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6: Heap-use-after-free in Asterisk PJSIP TCP/SDP handling when TCP connection closes during SDP processing
- !GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2: CVE-2022-37325 fix is absent from current chan\_ooh323 Q.931 party-number parser
- !GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94: Possible RED T.140 Generation Accumulation OOB Write
- !GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f: Stack buffer overflow in res\_xmpp XMPP namespace prefix handling
- !GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m: SQL Injection in cel\_pgsql and cel\_tds via CELGenUserEvent eventtype Field
- !GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5: Asterisk app\_sms.c copies externally controlled SMS lengths into fixed in-struct buffers
- !GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx: Out-of-Bounds Write in Codec2 Decoder Due to Floor/Ceil Sample Count Mismatch
- !GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp: LDAP Filter Injection in res\_config\_ldap via SIP Username (Unauthenticated Information Disclosure)
- !GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687: Possible RED T.140 Heap Buffer Overflow
- !GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959: ARI setChannelVar bypasses live\_dangerously and permits FILE() writes
- !GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c: ARI REST-over-WebSocket read-only bypass allows arbitrary module path load and conditional RCE
- !GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3: Stack Buffer Overflow in H.323 ooTrace() via Unbounded vsprintf into Fixed 2048-byte Buffer
- !GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c: ast\_loggrabber executes python script in world writable directory(`/tmp`) leading to potential privilege escalation And RCE

### Commits By Author:

- 
#### George Joseph (6):

  - chan\_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone\_number field.
  - res\_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
  - pjsip\_message\_filter: Use pj\_strdup instead of pj\_strassign to save local address.
  - ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn’t run out-of-bounds.
  - ARI: Make ARI applications respect live\_dangerously.
  - res\_rtp\_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.

- 
#### Mike Bradeen (3):

  - ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
  - manager: Use remote address in user error logging
  - ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging

- 
#### Milan Kyselica (7):

  - res\_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
  - res\_pjsip\_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
  - res\_config\_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
  - cel\_pgsql, cel\_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
  - http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
  - codec\_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
  - format\_ogg\_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow

- 
#### Pengpeng Hou (1):

  - app\_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers

- 
#### Roberto Paleari (1):

  - res/res\_pjsip\_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser

- 
#### ThatTotallyRealMyth (1):

  - ast\_loggrabber: Install the ast\_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.

### Commit List:

- ast\_loggrabber: Install the ast\_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.
- chan\_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone\_number field.
- ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length
- res\_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.
- pjsip\_message\_filter: Use pj\_strdup instead of pj\_strassign to save local address.
- ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn’t run out-of-bounds.
- ARI: Make ARI applications respect live\_dangerously.
- res\_rtp\_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.
- res/res\_pjsip\_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser
- manager: Use remote address in user error logging
- ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging
- app\_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers
- res\_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling
- res\_pjsip\_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser
- res\_config\_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515
- cel\_pgsql, cel\_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection
- http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS
- codec\_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder
- format\_ogg\_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow

### Commit Details:

#### ast\_loggrabber: Install the ast\_tsconvert.py script to a secure temp directory.

Author: ThatTotallyRealMyth  
Date: 2026-03-19

The ast\_tsconvert.py script called by ast\_loggrabber is now installed in a  
temporary directory that isn’t world readable or writable.

Resolves: #GHSA-xgj6-2gc5-5x9c

#### chan\_unistim.c: Prevent overrun of phone\_number field.

Author: George Joseph  
Date: 2026-06-15

Add a check to key\_dial\_page() to ensure that dialed digits won’t overrun  
the phone\_number field.

Resolves: #GHSA-3g56-cgrh-95p5

#### ooh323c: not checking for IE minimum length

Author: Mike Bradeen  
Date: 2022-06-06

When decoding q.931 encoded calling/called number  
now checking for length being less than minimum required.

Resolves: #GHSA-h5hv-jmgj-92q2

#### res\_ari: Ensure read-only users are properly authorized via REST Over WebSocket.

Author: George Joseph  
Date: 2026-06-12

The REST over WebSocket path now properly prevents non-GET methods from  
being executed on inbound WebSockets.

- The query parameters from the original incoming GET request that caused the  
upgrade to WebSocket are now passed to all REST requests that come from the  
client. This ensures that if the client authenticated with a read-only  
userid using the “api\_key” query\_string parameter, REST requests coming  
in over the WebSocket will only be able to execute GETs on resources.  
The HTTP headers were already passed to the REST requests so if the  
client had authenticated via an “Authorization” it was properly handled.

- New tests have been added to test\_ari.c to check that read-only users  
are properly denied access to resources using non-GET methods. Several  
memory leaks were also squashed.

Resolves: #GHSA-wcvv-g26m-wx5c

#### pjsip\_message\_filter: Use pj\_strdup instead of pj\_strassign to save local address.

Author: George Joseph  
Date: 2026-06-10

The filter\_on\_tx\_message() function was using pj\_strassign() to save the pointer  
of the pjproject transport local address to a local pj\_str\_t variable. That  
variable was ultimately used to set the Contact header’s uri-\>host and the SDP  
connection attribute’s address again using pj\_strassign. pj\_strassign() doesn’t  
copy the actual value of the pj\_str\_t however, it just copies the pointer so  
if a connection-oriented transport is disconnected before the 200 OK with the  
SDP is sent, those pointers will be invalid which can cause use-after-free  
issues. To prevent this, filter\_on\_tx\_message() now uses pj\_strdup with the  
tdata-\>pool as the backing store to save the local IP address to the local  
variable. pj\_strassign() can then be used safely later on since the tdata  
will be available for the life of the transaction.

Resolves: #GHSA-g8q2-p36q-94f6

#### ooh323c/ooq931.c: Ensure ooQ931Decode doesn’t run out-of-bounds.

Author: George Joseph  
Date: 2026-06-02

Several bounds checks have been edded to ooQ931Decode to prevent it from  
running past the end of the data buffer when parsing information elements.

Resolves: #GHSA-746q-794h-cc7f

#### ARI: Make ARI applications respect live\_dangerously.

Author: George Joseph  
Date: 2026-05-21

DeveloperNote: ARI applications can no longer call “dangerous” dialplan  
functions like DB(), FILE(), SHELL(), CURL(), STAT(), etc. without  
enabling “live\_dangerously” in asterisk.conf.

Resolves: #GHSA-vrfp-mg3q-3959

#### res\_rtp\_asterisk.c: Address 2 potential T.140 RED buffer overruns.

Author: George Joseph  
Date: 2026-04-27

- Add check to red\_t140\_to\_red() to ensure that the new primary payload  
can’t cause the rtp\_red-\>len array items to wrap or cause an overrun of  
the rtp\_red-\>t140red\_data buffer.

- Add check to rtp\_red\_buffer() to ensure that a T.140 frame to be sent  
can’t cause rtp\_red-\>len array items to wrap or cause an overrun of  
the rtp\_red-\>buf\_data buffer.

Resolves: #GHSA-vfhr-r9x9-c687  
Resolves: #GHSA-j2mm-57pq-jh94

#### res/res\_pjsip\_pubsub.c: Fix buffer over-read in MWI body parser

Author: Roberto Paleari  
Date: 2026-04-29

Add constraint checks to prevent unauthenticated users from crashing Asterisk  
instance by sending a crafted inbound SIP NOTIFY request with “Content-Type:  
application/simple-message-summary”.

Resolves: #GHSA-8jw3-ccr9-xrmf

#### manager: Use remote address in user error logging

Author: Mike Bradeen  
Date: 2026-03-30

To avoid a potential null dereference use the remote address  
in error logging when there is no user or the user acl fails.

Resolves: #GHSA-3rhj-hhw7-m6fw

#### ooh323: Prevent potential buffer overflow in trace logging

Author: Mike Bradeen  
Date: 2026-03-31

Replace a call to vsprintf with a call to ast\_vasprintf to  
prevent a possible buffer overflow.

Resolves: #GHSA-x348-j6c9-77f3

#### app\_sms: Bound protocol 1 SMS unpacking to fixed-size buffers

Author: Pengpeng Hou  
Date: 2026-04-01

The protocol 1 unpack helpers trusted externally controlled lengths and wrote  
them directly into fixed-size buffers in sms\_t. Clamp the address, header,  
and body copies to the destination array sizes so malformed messages cannot  
overwrite adjacent state.

Resolves: #GHSA-q9fr-m7g8-6ph5

#### res\_xmpp: Fix stack buffer overflow in namespace prefix handling

Author: Milan Kyselica  
Date: 2026-03-26

The snprintf size parameter in xmpp\_action\_hook() is computed from  
the attacker-controlled namespace prefix length and is not bounded  
by the 256-byte stack buffer size. When a remote XMPP peer sends a  
stanza with a child element whose namespace prefix exceeds 249  
characters, snprintf writes past the buffer boundary.

Use sizeof(attr) as the snprintf size limit and %.\*s precision to  
extract only the prefix portion of the element name, preserving  
the original truncation behavior for valid inputs.

Resolves: #GHSA-mxgm-8c6f-5p8f

#### res\_pjsip\_pubsub: Add width limit to sscanf in MWI NOTIFY parser

Author: Milan Kyselica  
Date: 2026-03-24

The parse\_simple\_message\_summary() function uses sscanf with an  
unbounded %s format specifier to parse the Message-Account field  
from incoming SIP NOTIFY bodies into a fixed-size 512-byte stack  
buffer (PJSIP\_MAX\_URL\_SIZE). A single unauthenticated SIP NOTIFY  
with a Message-Account value exceeding 512 bytes overflows the  
buffer, corrupting adjacent stack data and permanently disabling  
the PJSIP transport layer without crashing the process.

Add a width specifier (%511s) to limit the sscanf write to  
PJSIP\_MAX\_URL\_SIZE - 1 bytes plus the NUL terminator, matching  
the destination buffer size.

Resolves: #GHSA-589g-qgf8-m6mx

#### res\_config\_ldap: Escape LDAP filter values per RFC 4515

Author: Milan Kyselica  
Date: 2026-03-23

The LDAP realtime driver constructs search filters by directly  
concatenating user-supplied values without RFC 4515 escaping.  
When LDAP is used as a realtime backend for endpoint  
identification, characters with special meaning in LDAP filters  
(\*, (, ), ) can be injected via the SIP From header username.

Add ldap\_filter\_escape\_value() that escapes RFC 4515 special  
characters to their \HH hex representation, and apply it to  
non-LIKE query values. The LIKE query path preserves the existing  
wildcard conversion behavior with a note for maintainers.

Resolves: #GHSA-r6c2-hwc2-j4mp

#### cel\_pgsql, cel\_tds: Escape eventtype field to prevent SQL injection

Author: Milan Kyselica  
Date: 2026-03-23

The eventtype column handler in cel\_pgsql.c inserts  
record.user\_defined\_name directly into the SQL query without  
calling PQescapeStringConn(), while all other string fields in  
the same function are properly escaped. Similarly, cel\_tds.c  
passes the raw user\_defined\_name into the SQL INSERT without  
routing it through anti\_injection(), while all other fields are  
processed through that function.

For cel\_pgsql.c, escape the eventtype value using  
PQescapeStringConn(), matching the existing pattern used for all  
other string fields at lines 308-331 of the same function.

For cel\_tds.c, route the eventtype value through  
anti\_injection() consistent with how all other fields are handled  
in the same function.

Resolves: #GHSA-ph27-3m5q-mj5m

#### http: Escape error page text to prevent reflected XSS

Author: Milan Kyselica  
Date: 2026-04-08

The text parameter in ast\_http\_create\_response() is inserted into  
the HTML body without escaping, while the server name on the same  
page is properly escaped via ast\_xml\_escape(). When res\_phoneprov  
passes the decoded request URI as the text of a 404 response, HTML  
metacharacters in the URI are rendered by the browser.

Apply ast\_xml\_escape() to the text parameter before inserting it  
into the HTML template, using the same function already used for  
the server name.

Resolves: #GHSA-4pgv-j3mr-3rcp

#### codec\_codec2: Only process complete Codec2 frames in decoder

Author: Milan Kyselica  
Date: 2026-04-08

The codec2\_samples() function uses floor division (160 \* datalen/6)  
to compute expected output samples, but the decode loop condition  
(x \< datalen) iterates with ceiling behavior when datalen is not a  
multiple of CODEC2\_FRAME\_LEN. This mismatch causes the loop to  
decode one extra frame beyond what the framework bounds check  
budgeted for, leading to an out-of-bounds write on the output buffer.

Change the loop condition to only process complete frames, matching  
the floor-division behavior of codec2\_samples(). This also prevents  
an out-of-bounds read on the input side when fewer than  
CODEC2\_FRAME\_LEN bytes remain.

Resolves: #GHSA-qf8j-jp7h-c5hx

#### format\_ogg\_speex: Add bounds check to prevent heap buffer overflow

Author: Milan Kyselica  
Date: 2026-03-23

The ogg\_speex\_read() function copies OGG packet data via memcpy()  
without validating the packet size against the destination buffer  
(BUF\_SIZE = 200 bytes). A crafted .spx file with an oversized OGG  
audio packet causes a heap buffer overflow that corrupts the  
adjacent speex\_desc structure containing libogg heap pointers,  
leading to a crash (SIGSEGV) on playback.

Add a bounds check for both negative and oversized values before  
the memcpy, consistent with how format\_ogg\_vorbis bounds its reads  
via ov\_read().

Resolves: #GHSA-8jhw-m2hg-vp3h

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![gjoseph](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/asterisk/user_avatar/community.asterisk.org/gjoseph/32/1690_2.png) [@gjoseph](https://community.asterisk.org/u/gjoseph)\
**Post date:** [June 25, 2026, 5:22pm UTC](https://community.asterisk.org/t/asterisk-security-release-23-4-1/113395/2 "2026-06-25T17:22:15Z")

</div>

Closed on June 25, 2026, 5:22pm UTC



---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![gjoseph](https://sea1.discourse-cdn.com/asterisk/user_avatar/community.asterisk.org/gjoseph/32/1690_2.png) [@gjoseph](https://community.asterisk.org/u/gjoseph)\
**Post date:** [June 25, 2026, 5:22pm UTC](https://community.asterisk.org/t/asterisk-security-release-23-4-1/113395/3 "2026-06-25T17:22:22Z")

</div>

Pinned globally on June 25, 2026, 5:22pm UTC


